Chicago-Kent College of Law

Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Louis Jackson National Student Writing
Competition

Institute for Law and the Workplace

1-1-2011

Discrimination v. Retaliation: What Level of Harm is Necessary to
Establish a Cause of Action Under Title VII?
Brendan Hanner White
The University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/louis_jackson
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
White, Brendan Hanner, "Discrimination v. Retaliation: What Level of Harm is Necessary to Establish a
Cause of Action Under Title VII?" (2011). Louis Jackson National Student Writing Competition. 13.
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/louis_jackson/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Law and the Workplace at Scholarly
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louis Jackson National Student
Writing Competition by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For
more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

DISCRIMINATION V. RETALIATION: WHAT LEVEL OF HARM IS
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE VII?
Brendan Hanner White

I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars employers from discriminating against
employees who are members of a protected class.1 Two provisions of Title VII advance this goal.
Section 7032 sets forth the basic prohibition, stating that an employer cannot “discriminate
against” an employee based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” with regard to an
employee‟s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”3 Section 704,4 Title
VII‟s anti-retaliation provision, supplements this ban by making it “an unlawful employment
practice” for an employer to “discriminate against any of his employees…because he has
opposed any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”5 Also under section 704, an employer
cannot discriminate against an employee because that employee has “made a charge, testified,

1

See 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or,
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin”).
3
Id.
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees or applicants for employment…because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”).
5
Id.
2

1

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under section
703. 6
In analyzing these two sections, courts have struggled to determine whether some
minimum level of harm must be shown to trigger the protections of these prohibitions, and, if so,
what that level of harm should be. Neither statute specifies a “baseline” level of harm as an
element of the cause of action. 7
Nonetheless, prior to the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White,8 almost every Circuit recognized a minimum “adverse employment
action” requirement in order to bring either a section 703 or section 704 claim.9 The effect of
recognizing an “adverse employment action” element was to require an employee show more
than the employer‟s action was motivated by discrimination. In addition, the employee had to
show the employer‟s action caused him a minimum level of harm that is “serious,”10
“significant,”11 or “material.”12

6

Id.
See Leading Cases, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 312, 320 (2006).
8
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
9
See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 320. See also Autumn George, Student Author, “Adverse Employment Action”How Much Harm Must be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII?, 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1075, 1082
(2009); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 Emory L.J. 1121, 1131 (1998); Lisa Taylor, Adding
Subjective Fuel to the Vague-Standard Fire: A Proposal for Congressional Intervention After Burlington Northern v.
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 533, 536-7 (2007).
10
Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation, 536 F. 3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that an African
American plaintiff’s claim that she was disciplined more harshly that her white colleague was not a serious enough
employment action to assert a cognizable claim under section 703).
11
Vann v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 179 Fed. Appx. 491, 498 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding a transfer that did
not require plaintiff to buy or sell a house was not a change in employment significant enough to assert a
cognizable claim under section 703).
12
Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F. 3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding the plaintiff’s reassignment to sell
homes in another neighborhood was not a material harm under section 703 because the reassignment would not
affect the plaintiff’s compensation).
7

2

In Burlington Northern, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether an “adverse
action” was necessary to establish a claim under section 704.13 The Supreme Court stated the
legal questions presented in Burlington Northern as follows: “Does [section 704] confine
actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how
harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope?”14
The Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, reasoning that the
coverage of section 704 “extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory
acts and harm.”15 As to the second question, the Supreme Court held an adverse action must be
“material,” which the Supreme Court defined as conduct harmful enough that it would have
“dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”16
In reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court compared the reach of section 703 and
section 704. It did so in part because the defendant and the Solicitor General argued that liability
under both section 703 and section 704 was triggered only by a material change in the “terms or
conditions of employment.”17 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that Title
VII provided broader protection for victims of retaliation than for victims of race-based, religionbased, ethnicity-based, or gender-based discrimination.18 The Supreme Court explained this
difference resulted from Congress‟s inclusion of the “terms and conditions” language in section
703 but not in section 704.

13

548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
Id.
15
Id. at 67.
16
Id. at 68 (citing Rochon v. Gonzalez, 438 F. 3d. 1211, 1219 (C.A.D.C. 2006)).
17
While the Solicitor General agreed with the defendant regarding the materiality standard in the Sixth Circuit, the
Solicitor General was not arguing that the actions by the defendant were insufficient to bring a claim under that
test.
18
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 66.
14
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In establishing that section 703 and section 704 operate in different ways, the Supreme
Court created uncertainty regarding the issue of whether a materiality standard exists for section
703 claims, and, if so, what that standard would be.19 In particular, there is uncertainty as to
whether any materiality standard for section 703 claims should be more burdensome on plaintiffs
than the materiality standard the Supreme Court established for claims under section 704.
In the wake of the Burlington Northern decision, all Circuit Courts presented with the
issue have determined that a materiality standard exists for section 703 claims, finding the
employer‟s action must cause direct or indirect economic harm to the employee.20 Some lower
courts have gone further and determined that direct or indirect economic harm alone is not
enough to establish a claim under section 703.21 These courts have found in Burlington Northern
support for the view that the section 703 materiality standard requires an employee establish not
only direct or indirect economic harm, but direct or indirect economic harm that is greater than
the level of harm required to bring an action under section 704.22
This reading of Burlington Northern is wrong. The Supreme Court did not hold or
suggest that, if a materiality standard does exist for section 703 claims, it should be more onerous
for plaintiffs, and more protective of employers, than the materiality standard imposed by section
704.
On close inspection, Burlington Northern leaves open three important questions
regarding section 703 claims: First, does a materiality standard exist for such claims? Second, if
a materiality standard does exist, what level of harm must be shown in order to bring such a

19

Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 313.
See George, supra note 9, at 1087 (2009).
21
See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
22
This error is not limited to the courts. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 321-2.
20
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claim? Third, if there is a materiality standard for section 703 claims, what is that standard‟s
relationship to the materiality standard established by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern
for section 704 claims? Each of these questions is sufficiently complex to warrant its own
lengthy discussion. As a result, in this paper, I will put the first two questions to one side and
address only the third question.
In particular, I ask whether the Title VII plaintiff must prove a greater material injury to
establish a section 703 claim than a section 704 claim. I conclude the answer to this question is
clearly “no” and that lower courts have misread Burlington Northern in reaching a contrary
result.
II. THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN OPINION
In Burlington Northern, the plaintiff Sheila White worked for defendant Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company (hereafter “defendant”) as a “track laborer” with her
primary responsibility being operation of the forklift.23 After complaining that her immediate
supervisor made inappropriate remarks to her, White was moved to more standard track laborer
tasks. Some of the standard track labor tasks performed by White after this move were removing
and replacing track components, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spillage. These tasks
involved dirty, heavy manual labor, unlike her forklift duties.24 Faced with this change in job
responsibility, White filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereafter “EEOC”), claiming that this reassignment was the result of retaliation for her earlier
complaints.25 Shortly thereafter, White was suspended without pay on the basis that her

23

548 U.S. at 57.
Id.
25
Id. at 58.
24
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supervisor claimed she was insubordinate, although the suspension was later overturned and
White received backpay.26 Both the reassignment and the suspension formed the basis of the
retaliation claim White brought against the defendant.
In defense of the section 704 claim brought by White, the defendant did not argue that the
motivation for its actions was not retaliatory.27 Rather, the defendant contended that its alleged
actions were not harmful enough to support a claim under section 704. More specifically, the
defendant stated that the reassignment of duties did not constitute impermissible retaliation
because moving White to more standard track laborer tasks fell within the same job
description.28 With regard to the suspension, the defendant alleged that no adverse action had
taken place because White was eventually reinstated with backpay.29
A jury found in favor of White and awarded her $43,500 in compensatory damages,
including $3,250 in medical expenses. The District Court denied the defendant‟s post-trial
motion for judgment based on the defenses mentioned above as a matter of law. A panel of the
Sixth Circuit reversed, but the full Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, voted to uphold the District
Court‟s judgment.30 The judges differed, however, on what level of harm an employer‟s action
must reach in order to support a section 704 claim.31 A majority of the Circuit Court used the
case as an opportunity to confirm the Sixth Circuit‟s previously established materiality standard
for section 703 discrimination claims set forth in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management.32
Specifically, the Circuit Court held that the employer‟s action must involve a materially adverse

26

Id. at 58-9.
Id. at 70.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 72.
30
Id. at 59.
31
Id.
32
97 F. 3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996).
27
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change in the terms of the worker‟s employment. 33 The Sixth Circuit majority in Burlington
Northern concluded that this standard should also apply to retaliation claims.34 Under this
interpretation, a claim could only be brought under section 704 if the harm imposed on the
employer was actionable under section 703, and vice versa. In a concurring opinion, five judges
of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with this standard, suggesting that no materiality standard should
operate for section 704 claims because no words within section 704 comparable to the “terms
and conditions” language of section 703 expressed any limitation on the anti-retaliation
provision‟s application.35 The decision of the Sixth Circuit conflicted with decisions of other
circuits regarding the materiality standard for section 704, and the Supreme Court took the case
for that reason. 36
In its opinion, the Supreme Court outlined the several definitions of “adverse
employment action” used by lower courts in applying section 704. In addition to the Sixth
Circuit‟s holding that section 703 and section 704 have an identical materiality standard, the
Supreme Court noted the Fifth and Eighth Circuits had adopted a more defendant-favorable
approach to evaluating section 704 claims.37 Specifically, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied
an “ultimate employment decision” standard, which limited actionable retaliatory conduct to acts
“such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating.”38 The Supreme
Court noted that other Circuit Courts allowed application of section 704 even when the alleged
harm does not concern hiring, firing or compensation decisions. In particular, the Seventh Circuit
and District of Columbia Circuit had required only that the alleged conduct “would likely have
33

White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 364 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Id.
35
See id. at 816-7 (Clay, concurring).
36
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 60.
37
Id.
38
Id. (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodax Co., 104 F. 3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
34
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„dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,‟ ”39 while
the Ninth Circuit mandated that the plaintiff establish that the alleged retaliatory treatment must
be “reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.” 40
After outlining these different approaches, the Supreme Court addressed the argument of
the defendant and the Solicitor General that the anti-retaliation provision should be read “in pari
materia” with the antidiscrimination provision.41 Specifically, the defendant and the Solicitor
General argued that application of section 704 should be limited to conduct that “affects the
employee‟s „compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.‟ ”42 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, stating that section 703 differs from section 704 “in important
ways.”43
In drawing a distinction between the two sections, the Supreme Court stated that the
words “hire,” “discharge,” “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,”
“employment opportunities,” and “status as an employee” present in the language of section 703
explicitly limit the application of that section to “actions that affect employment or alter the
conditions of the workplace.”44 In comparison, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that “[n]o
such limiting words appear in the antiretaliation provision.”45 The Supreme Court determined

39

Id. (citing Washington v. Illinois Dept of Revenue, 420 F. 3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 61 (citing Ray v. Henderson, 217 F. 3d 1234, 1242-1243 (9th Cir. 2000)).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 62.
45
Id.
40
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Congress must have intended this difference in language to signal that these two sections have a
different scope. 46
The Supreme Court relied on statutory purpose, as well as statutory text, in making this
determination. According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of section 703 is to provide
“equality of employment opportunities” and to avoid the creation of “stratified job
environments.” 47 To achieve these objectives, Congress did not need to prohibit employer
conduct “other than employment-related discrimination.”48 The objective of section 704, in
contrast, is “preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee‟s
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act‟s basic guarantees.” 49 To properly achieve
this end, Congress needed to include employer actions that occur beyond the workplace because
“[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly
related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”50 Based on these
differences in purpose and language, the Supreme Court found that section 704, unlike section
703, “is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of
employment.”51 In making this determination, the Supreme Court also noted “Congress has
provided similar kinds of protection from retaliation in comparable statutes without any judicial
suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct prohibited by the primary substantive
provisions.”52 On this basis, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the defendant and the

46

Id. at 63.
Id. (emphasis added).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 64.
52
Id. at 66. The Supreme Court relied specifically on the National Labor Relations Act and its anti-retaliation
provision, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4), and decisions cited under that statute. See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731 (1983); NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
47
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Solicitor General, holding instead that section 704 is not limited to discrimination with respect to
employment-related activity.53 Therefore, certain employer actions can establish a claim under
section 704 if motivated by retaliation that would not establish a claim under section 703 if
motivated by discrimination.
After determining that section 704 reached adverse action outside the workplace, the
Supreme Court turned to the level of harm an employee needs to show in order to bring a claim
under this section. Ultimately, the Supreme Court adopted the approach previously endorsed by
the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits, namely that an employee must show the
retaliatory conduct would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.”54 In holding that a claim under section 704 required a level of harm
that should be viewed under an objective standard, the Supreme Court stated it was trying to
“separate significant from trivial harms.”55 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that “petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” will not dissuade a reasonable
worker from complaining of discriminatory conduct.56 Through this holding, the Supreme Court,
for the first time,57 established a materiality standard under Title VII.
Based on this materiality standard, the Supreme Court found there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury‟s verdict on White‟s retaliation claim.58 First, the Supreme Court
rejected the defendant‟s argument that sufficient retaliatory conduct did not occur because
White‟s reassigned duties still fell within her job description. The Supreme Court noted that

53

Id.
Id. at 68 (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (C.A.D.C. 2006)).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Cf. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Ellerth did not address the question of materiality;
rather, it addressed the question of vicarious liability under Title VII’s section 703.
58
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 70.
54
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almost every job category involves responsibilities and duties that are less desirable than others
and that an effective way to discourage an employee from complaining of discrimination would
be to assign her more arduous tasks.59 The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
White‟s reinstatement with backpay made her suspension statutorily insignificant. The Supreme
Court noted that while White did receive backpay, she was still without a paycheck for a
month.60 White‟s emotional distress during the period in which she had no income supported the
conclusion that “[a] reasonable employee facing the choice between retaining her job (and
paycheck) and filing a discrimination complaint might well choose the former.”61 Therefore, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
III. THE LOWER COURTS‟ INTERPRETATION OF THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN
OPINION
Burlington Northern did not establish the scope of a materiality standard regarding
section 703 claims, nor did it explore the relationship between the section 704 materiality
standard and any potential materiality standard for section 703 claims. Nevertheless, several
lower courts have read Burlington Northern as confirming the need for plaintiffs to prove a more
material injury to establish a section 703 claim than a section 704 claim.62 The following
decisions from the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit illustrate the point.

59

Id. at 70-1.
Id. at 72.
61
Id. at 73.
62
See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text. See also George, supra note 9, at 1085 (recognizing the Eleventh
Circuit’s test was unchanged by Burlington Northern).
60
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A. The Eleventh Circuit
In Grimsley v. Marshall,63 the Eleventh Circuit held that it would continue to apply the
materiality standard for discrimination claims under section 703 that it had established prior to
the Burlington Northern decision. In Grimsley, the plaintiff, a white warehouse supervisor for the
defendant Marshalls of Ma, Inc., alleged he was treated differently from African American
warehouse supervisors. Specifically, he alleged that, unlike African American supervisors, he
was asked to work late and on weekends, was given more work than African American
supervisors, and was required to perform manual labor tasks usually reserved for hourly
employees, such as sweeping or re-taping lines on the floor in areas assigned to African
American supervisors.64 When the plaintiff asked why he was assigned specialized work in the
African American supervisors‟ areas and was generally assigned more work, his supervisor
responded that the African American supervisors were “too lazy” and “too stupid” to perform
jobs adequately.65 The district court held that the plaintiff had in fact presented direct evidence of
discriminatory intent but granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that the harm
alleged was not sufficient to establish an adverse employment action.66
On appeal, the plaintiff argued he was not required to show an “adverse employment
action” because it was undisputed that the acts in question were motivated by race.67 In support
of this argument, the plaintiff cited Burlington Northern as confirmation of a broad application

63

284 F. App’x. 604 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 606.
65
Id.
66
See id. at 607.
67
Id. at 609.
64
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of Title VII‟s anti-discrimination provision. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument,
reasoning the “materially adverse” standard of Burlington Northern was limited to antiretaliation claims and, that “the Supreme Court was careful to note that a different standard
applied to substantive claims of discrimination.”68 The Eleventh Circuit went on to emphasize its
view of the distinction made in Burlington Northern by stating that the case had held that “the
anti-retaliation provision forbids conduct not prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision.”69
Based on this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit stated the Burlington Northern decision confirmed
the application of its materiality standard for Title VII anti-discrimination claims previously
established in Davis v. Town of Lake Park, namely, that “to prove adverse employment action in
a case under Title VII‟s anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show a serious and
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 70 Based on the “serious
and material change” standard established in Davis, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.71
B. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has also interpreted Burlington Northern as confirming that its
demanding materiality standard of “ultimate employment decisions” remains controlling for
section 703 discrimination claims even though the Supreme Court rejected this standard for
purposes of section 704.72 In Mitchell v. Snow,73 the plaintiff Mitchell received a score of 4.2 out

68

Id. at 608.
Id.
70
Id. at 608 (citing Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)).
71
Id. at 611.
72
Mitchell v. Snow, 326 F. App’x. 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2009). See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (“We therefore
reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated the antiretaliation provision as forbidding
the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination provision and that have limited actionable retaliation to socalled ‘ultimate employment decisions’”).
69
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of 5 in her early job performance review for the fiscal year ending in May 2003. Mitchell argued
that this review reflected unlawful discrimination based on her race and sex.74 The district court
employed the “ultimate employment decision” test established in the Fifth Circuit, holding that
section 703 supports discrimination claims only for decisions such as “hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting or compensating.”75 Finding no evidence that connected Mitchell‟s
performance review to her compensation, the district court granted a motion for summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.76 In other words, even if the performance review was
impermissibly motivated, it was not actionable without a showing of economic loss.
On appeal, Mitchell argued the Burlington Northern decision suggested that a claim
under section 703 only requires the employer action in question be motivated by discrimination
so long as the act occurs within the workplace.77 Therefore, because the poor job performance
review was motivated by discrimination and directly concerned her work, Mitchell argued she
had a valid cause of action under section 703. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, finding
instead that Burlington Northern established that “title VII‟s anti-retaliation provision is broader
than the range covered by its anti-discrimination provisions.”78 Based on this analysis of
Burlington Northern, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that its highly exacting “adverse employment
action” standard was “therefore accurate.”79 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court‟s grant of

73

326 F. App’x. 852 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 854-5.
75
Id. at 854 (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007)). The McCoy decision was
decided after Burlington Northern. However, in that decision the Fifth Circuit directly addressed whether
Burlington Northern affected its materiality standard regarding section 703 claims. The court specifically stated
that even after Burlington Northern the previously established materiality standard regarding section 703 claims
(referenced above) remains controlling.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 854-5.
78
Id. at 855.
79
Id.
74
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summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the poor job performance review did not
constitute an ultimate employment decision.
C. The Sixth Circuit
Although the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern directly stated that the Sixth
Circuit‟s interpretation of the materiality standard regarding section 704 was incorrect,80 the
Sixth Circuit has read that decision as confirming the appropriateness of retaining that very
standard for section 703 claims. In discussing the merits of the plaintiff‟s discrimination claim in
Tepper v. Potter,81 in which the plaintiff alleged the termination of his religious accommodation
was impermissible faith-based discrimination, the Sixth Circuit spelled out its interpretation of
section 703‟s “adverse employment action” standard in the wake of the Burlington Northern
decision. Emphasizing that Burlington Northern distinguished the anti-retaliation and the antidiscrimination provisions in Title VII, the Circuit Court ruled that Burlington Northern, “did not
expand or alter this Court‟s formulation of an adverse employment action for purposes of the
discrimination claim before us.”82 Therefore, the court found the plaintiff did not meet the
materiality standard established in the Sixth Circuit, which requires a material change in
employment status such as “termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in
wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished
material responsibilities, or other indices.” 83

80

Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (“We therefore reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that
have treated the antiretaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination
provision and that have limited actionable retaliation to so-called ‘ultimate employment decisions’”).
81
505 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2007).
82
Id. at 515.
83
Id. (citing Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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IV. CRITIQUING LOWER COURTS‟ APPLICATION OF BURLINGTON NORTHERN TO
SECTION 703 CLAIMS.
As the previous discussion shows, Circuit Courts are holding that any materiality
standard for a discrimination claim brought under section 703 is more demanding of plaintiffs
than the materiality standard established for section 704 claims. A proper understanding of the
language used by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern to distinguish the two sections, as
well as the intended purpose behind each section, shows this materiality distinction made by the
lower courts is incorrect.
A. Improper understanding of the reasoning of Burlington Northern to distinguish section 703
and section 704.
Courts have read Burlington Northern as setting a heightened materiality standard under
section 703, based on the belief that the case held the materiality standard established for section
704 is more protective of plaintiffs than any materiality standard for section 703.84 This
confusion is understandable. However, it reflects a misreading of Burlington Northern.
The fundamental misunderstanding of the lower courts in interpreting Burlington
Northern stems from a failure to appreciate the particular context in which the Supreme Court
broadened the reach of section 704 in relation to section 703. In differentiating the two sections,
the Supreme Court was highlighting that section 704 is broader than section 703 in regard to
section 704‟s coverage, not its materiality standard. In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized
that section 703 outlaws discrimination only as to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or

84

See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
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privileges of employment.”85 The Supreme Court stated, however, that “[n]o such limiting words
appear in the antiretaliation provision” of section 704.86 This textual distinction allowed the
Supreme Court to reason that “Congress intended the differences” in coverage between the two
sections and that those differences mattered.87 The Supreme Court added that this different
coverage makes sense because “the two provisions differ not only in language but in purpose as
well.”88 Therefore, the Court determined the anti-retaliation provision is “not coterminous” with
the anti-discrimination provision because it “extends beyond workplace-related or employmentrelated retaliatory acts and harm.”89
The only distinction between the two sections articulated by the Supreme Court is that
section 704 has a broader coverage than section 703 in that section 704 can apply to actions that
fall completely outside of the work environment, while the coverage of section 703 is limited to
discrimination that takes place within the office or directly relates to the employee/employer
relationship.90 This distinction makes sense because an employer can retaliate against an
employee in a way that is completely separate from the work environment, and conduct that has
an impermissibly retaliatory effect can involve action wholly independent from the
employee/employer relationship. Simply put, the Supreme Court recognized that retaliatory acts
having no relation to terms, condition or privileges of employment can still deter an employee
from complaining about discrimination. Therefore, in order to give full meaning to the language
and purpose of section 704, actions outside the workplace could fall within the statute‟s
coverage.
85

Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62.
Id.
87
Id. at 63.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 67.
90
Id. at 63-8.
86
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For example, if a supervisor is the coach of the little league team on which the
employee‟s son is a player, and the supervisor cuts the employee‟s son from the team in
retaliation for the employee‟s filing of a discrimination charge, that would be retaliatory conduct
actionable under section 704 because this conduct would chill a reasonable employee from filing
or moving forward with a discrimination claim.91 However, such an act would not be actionable
under section 703 even if cutting the employee‟s son from the team was motivated by the
employee‟s race, national origin, religion or sex. While such an action motivated by
discrimination would unquestionably be morally reprehensible, it has no connection to the work
environment or the employee/employer relationship.92 As a result, the employee would have no
right to file a discrimination charge against the employer for this act under section 703 of Title
VII.93
In this sense, but only in this sense, it is accurate to say the reach of section 704 is
broader than the reach of section 703. Section 704 reaches non-work-related acts, while section
703 does not. Nothing in Burlington Northern, however, narrows the application of section 703
for acts that do occur within the workplace.
Rulings of the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits illustrate how the lower courts have
misinterpreted Burlington Northern as drawing a distinction between the two sections on the

91
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basis of materiality.94 The basic problem is that these lower courts have indicated that even
adverse actions that occur entirely within the workplace can be harmful enough to be actionable
under section 704 but not harmful enough to be actionable under section 703.95 Nothing in
Burlington Northern, however, supports this conclusion.
This misinterpretation appears to stem from language the Supreme Court used in
Burlington Northern that the lower courts have taken out of context. For example, the Supreme
Court stated in Burlington Northern that, “we do not accept…that it is „anomalous‟ to read the
statute to provide broader protection for victims of retaliation than for those whom Title VII
primarily seeks to protect, namely, victims of race-based, ethnic-based, religion-based, or
gender-based discrimination.”96 The Supreme Court went on to observe that it rejected the
standards established in the Courts of Appeals “that have treated the antiretaliation provision as
forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination provision.”97 Standing alone,
this language might be used, and indeed has been used, to argue that section 703 requires a
greater level of harm for an employee to bring a valid cause of action than the level of harm
required for a section 704 claim. The problem with such an argument, however, is that the
quoted language applies only to the coverage of the two provisions, and in particular the textbased limitation that section 703 applies only to discrimination with regard to “terms and
conditions of employment.” The quoted language does not in any way suggest that, when
discrimination within the workplace occurs, a greater showing of materiality of harm is required
for section 703 claims than for section 704 claims.
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In short, to read Burlington Northern as confirming that any materiality standard for
section 703 claims is more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy than the section 704 materiality
standard established in that case is an incorrect interpretation of the Supreme Court‟s opinion.98
B. Why Courts should reject a heightened materiality standard for section 703 claims.
Properly understood, any employer action within the workplace reached by section 704 is
an act that should support a section 703 discrimination claim. This is the case for at least three
separate reasons. First, while the purpose of section 704 logically requires that an employer‟s
discriminatory act create a reaction from an employee, the purpose of section 703 does not
require that an employer‟s discriminatory act create any reaction at all. Second, the practicalities
of human interactions support the need for a materiality standard regarding retaliation claims that
is not present for claims of discrimination. Third, it would be illogical for the core provision of
Title VII to give less protection to employees than the subsidiary provision that implements the
basic ban on discrimination.
1. The different purposes behind section 703 and section 704 dictate that the materiality
standard for section 703 should not be more exacting than the materiality standard for section
704.
Section 703 and section 704 have different purposes. The purpose of section 703 is to
remove discrimination based on race, sex, religion and national origin from the workplace.99 The
purpose of section 704, in contrast, is to ensure an employee will not be deterred by his employer
from filing, or assisting with, a section 703 discrimination complaint in order to ensure that the
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statutory mandate of section 703 is fulfilled.100 Based on this purpose, the materiality standard
established for section 704 claims in Burlington Northern is understandable. An employer‟s
action can only give rise to effective retaliation when that action is so significant that it would
have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”101
Therefore, if the employer‟s action is not sufficiently harmful to the employee, the employer has
not violated the purpose of section 704 even if his act was motivated by a desire to retaliate.
In striking contrast, there is no cause and effect relationship between an employer‟s
discriminatory action and the employee‟s response that has anything to do with the purpose of
section 703.The purpose behind section 703 is to ensure employees are not treated differently in
the work place based on their race, sex, religion or national origin. Achieving this goal has no
connection with how an employee will or will not react to the employer‟s discriminatory
conduct. Therefore, discrimination, as defined by the purpose of section 703, does not logically
focus at all on the reaction of the employee to the employer‟s conduct. For example, an
employer who refuses to sit with an employee because of his religious beliefs has violated the
purpose of section 703 by creating a workplace where an employee is treated differently because
of his religion. Whether or not that specific employee feels uncomfortable as a result of this
action is irrelevant to the purpose behind the statute. It is possible that this identical conduct,
motivated by the employer‟s desire to retaliate, would not be harmful enough to support a claim
under section 704. If this conduct would not chill an employee from filing or assisting in a
charge of discrimination, the purpose behind section 704 would not be fulfilled by prohibiting
such an action. However, the same is not true in respect to the purpose behind section 703. The
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act itself, regardless of the employee‟s reaction, creates a work environment where employees
are treated adversely based on discrimination.
Put another way, prohibiting discrimination in accordance with the purpose of section
703 would seem to only require analysis of the employer‟s intent for the act in question, not the
employee‟s reaction to that act. In contrast, to find retaliation as defined by the purpose of
section 704 requires an analysis of the employer‟s intent for the act in question as well as the
employee‟s reaction to that act. Perhaps, the different purposes of section 703 and section 704
offer support for the view that no showing of materiality should be necessary to establish a claim
under section 703. At the least, however, these differing purposes leave no doubt that any
materiality standard imposed by the courts for section 703 claims should not be more demanding
for plaintiffs than the materiality standard established by section 704.
2. While section 704 logically requires a materiality standard to protect understandable
employer actions, no analogous justification for a materiality standard exists for section 703.
In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court explained that a materiality standard makes
practical sense in the particular context of retaliation claims. As the Supreme Court emphasized,
an employee filing a discrimination complaint “cannot immunize that employee from those petty
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.”102
In establishing that section 704 claims cannot be brought on the basis of “snubbing” or other
somewhat trivial acts, the Supreme Court meant to protect the employer from being held liable
for committing acts that are an understandable, perhaps inevitable, reaction to an employee‟s
accusation of discrimination. It is a normal human reaction to become uncomfortable with or
apprehensive around an individual who has accused one of discrimination. It is likely, and
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certainly understandable, that a supervisor would change his interactions with an employee in the
workplace after that employee has accused him of committing an unlawful act. It is also possible
that resulting slights by the employer could make an employee feel uncomfortable. However, the
level of discomfort caused by petty slights would not be significant enough to cause a reasonable
employee to stop pursuing a claim of discrimination.103
By requiring a minimum level of severity of the actions that would give rise to a valid
section 704 claim, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that an employee should
anticipate his interactions with his employer will change on some level after he has accused that
employer of discrimination. By requiring retaliatory conduct reach a meaningful level of harm,
the Supreme Court in effect protected employers to the extent their conduct is understandable.
Only when the employer‟s conduct goes beyond a normal response to an employee‟s accusation
of discrimination does a section 704 claim exist.
This understandable-reaction justification for imposing a materiality standard in section
704 cases, however, has no application to employer actions that fall under section 703. The logic
of this justification for claims under section 704 is that an employer acting differently toward an
employee is a rational consequence of an employee accusing the employer of unlawful conduct.
In contrast, an employer treating an employee differently because of his race, religion, sex or
national origin is not a rational consequence of the employee‟s presence in the workplace. This
difference between the two sections may well suggest that courts could rightly impose no
materiality standard at all for claims under section 703. However, at a minimum, this difference
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negates any claim that courts should apply a stricter materiality standard for section 703 than the
one established under section 704.
3. It is anomalous to read Title VII as giving less protection to employees bringing a
claim under its core provision than under its secondary provision.
Even if one finds a materiality standard exists for section 703, imposing a more
demanding materiality standard for section 703 claims than for section 704 claims would be an
anomalous reading of Title VII. Finding a more demanding materiality standard for section 703
would indicate that it is proper to provide less protection in the workplace for those who are in
fact discriminated against on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin or religion, the very
victims which Title VII attempts to protect,104 than for those who merely complain about
discrimination, even when such complaints are unfounded. That cannot be what Congress
intended.
For example, if an employee were moved from a larger, more desirable office to a
smaller office that was less prestigious and less conducive to the work involved based on a
retaliatory motive by the employer, the employee would potentially have an actionable claim
under the objective materiality test established by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern for
section 704. However, the exact same action motivated by a discriminatory intent would not be
an actionable claim under section 703 based on the interpretation of the Burlington Northern
case by several Circuit Courts because such an act does not “directly relate to the employee‟s
compensation,” reflect an “ultimate employment action” or involve a “serious” harm.105 This
example illustrates the flaw in reading section 704 to reach impermissibly motivated conduct in
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the workplace that would not be actionable under section 703. Could the Supreme Court really
have read Title VII to protect those who believe they have been discriminated against by their
employers on the job, even if no discrimination occurred, while declining protection to those
who have actually suffered workplace discrimination based on race, religion, national origin or
sex? The answer is no.
Several Circuit Courts have held that section 703 contains a materiality standard based on
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language within the statute.106 It is true that
the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern highlighted that this language is present in section
703 but is not present in section 704. However, this distinction was only used by the Supreme
Court to show that section 703 was limited in its application to employer acts that occurred
within the workplace. In no way was that language used by the Supreme Court as a basis for
establishing that section 703 imposes its own materiality standard or that any materiality
standard for section 703 must be stricter on plaintiffs than the section 704 materiality standard.
The fact that the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language is not present in
section 704 should not be relied upon as a basis for holding section 703 has a materiality
standard that is harsher on plaintiffs. Such an interpretation would undermine the purposes
behind Title VII. Section 703 is centrally concerned with limiting an employer‟s ability to treat
an employee differently based on his race, sex, religion or national origin. It would be an
illogical reading of Title VII to hold an employer act that is harmful enough to deter an employee
from pursuing a claim of discrimination is not harmful enough to hold an employee is being
treated differently in the workplace.
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Consider again the Grimsley case, in which the Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiff did not
suffer an “adverse employment action” for a section 703 claim because working longer hours
and doing manual labor outside of his job description did not change his compensation or
position.107 The conduct taken against the plaintiff in Grimsley was even worse than the tasks
assigned to White in Burlington Northern, which the Supreme Court found harmful enough to
establish a section 704 claim.108 Therefore, the conduct against the plaintiff in Grimsley would
necessarily be harmful enough to establish a section 704 claim if the conduct in question was
motivated by retaliation. It would be an incorrect reading of Title VII, and a misunderstanding of
the statute‟s purpose, to provide less protection for the plaintiff in Grimsley, who suffered a more
material harm than White, simply because the harmful act in that case was motivated by the very
discrimination Title VII was at its core designed to prevent.109 If such an act is severe enough
that it would dissuade an employee from filing a complaint of discrimination, and thus provide
the basis for suit under section 704, then that same act motivated by discrimination must be
sufficient to support a claim of actual discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purposes behind section 704 led the Supreme Court to determine that a materiality
standard was required for that section. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was able to establish the
extent of the section 704 materiality standard based on that section‟s purposes. The Supreme
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Court, however, did not speak at all as to whether a materiality standard should exist for section
703, and, if so, what that standard should be. In making this determination, it must be understood
that the purposes behind section 703 are different from the purposes of section 704. These
differences may well suggest that no materiality standard should exist for section 703. At the
least, however, the different purposes behind the two sections make it clear that any materiality
standard for section 703 cannot be stricter on plaintiffs than the materiality standard established
for section 704.
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